Words mean things: categorizing non-state international security actors
Whitney Grespin and Caroline Batka reflect on why the language around private actors in international security services matters.
‘You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.’ The now immortal words of the character Inigo Montoya, created by William Goldman for his 1973 fantasy novel The Princess Bride, are still salient fifty years later in the nomenclature for the international security community. This is of particular importance regarding the language used for non-state actors who provide security services and training to US partners and allies. Understanding the roles, responsibilities and unique utility of contracted, non-state assistance in complex environments is essential for both scholars and practitioners of modern conflict and stabilization operations. Thus, they must recognize that words mean things — and should be used intentionally and accurately.
Building upon our research on the military and contingency contractors in the US, we come together in this blogpost to account for the terminology of private actors who provide international security services, so that a wide readership can engage more knowledgeably on an (admittedly niche) discourse.
Understanding contingency contractors
From the perspective of the US Department of Defense, services offered under the ‘contingency contracting field’ encompass all contracting performed in a contingency environment, including military operations, stability operations, humanitarian or peacekeeping operations and responses to natural disasters or other types of emergency.
The range of non-state actors involved in contingency contracting continues to widen as mercenaries, foreign terrorist fighters, militias, contractors and other non-state actors take on new roles in emerging types of warfare. The terminology used to refer to contractors working in defence and security operations has implications for their legal authority and legitimacy, as well as for the codes of conduct and regulations that guide them. Thus, improving the accurate use of terminology may enhance the efforts that aim to guide and oversee contractor behaviour.
The spectrum of existing (and overlapping) terminologies
Starting with the most under-regulated type of entity in the figure above, article 47 of Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Convention clearly defines a mercenary as having to meet six very specific criteria. Foreign [terrorist] fighters, via the United Nations’ definition, are ‘individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict’.
Next up is the ill-defined extraterritorial militia or ‘quasi-PMC’. This term has been bandied about for over a decade, but requires further refinement given the increased activity of groups with irregular characteristics and potential proxy functions. The term ‘private military company’ (PMC) is typically used as an umbrella term for all types of security and defence contractors, whereas private security companies (PSCs) are typically considered to be armed contractors who provide security services or combat support. As shown in figure 1, the professional industry is the most highly regulated — often through self-selection of good faith actors — with many crossover functions for non-security-related endeavours.
Why non-state security actors are miscategorized
Current typologies used for private non-state security actors have tended to focus on factors like the security companies employing armed personnel while ignoring entities involved in the augmentation, capacity-building, institutional transformation or professionalization of partner forces. These typologies originate from conceptions of military and security outsourcing during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there is now a whole new host of issues associated with the non-state security actors that have come to the forefront, including issues with predatory recruitment on social media and with the looting of natural resources. Updating and expanding these typologies is key given the changing nature of non-state actor participation in security activities, as has been seen with the widespread employment of entities like the Wagner Group to augment state security forces.
For example, three reputable sources have all categorized the Wagner Group differently. The Brookings Institution identified it as a PSC, while the US Congressional Research Service has coded the group as a PMC and New America, a think tank, has described them as a PMSC. Two scholars have recently asserted that Wagner is a quasi-PMC, while another recent work of scholarship has interrogated the group’s evolving characteristics in more detail and has characterized it as a quasi-state agent of influence.
In addition, state agencies’ characterizations of the Wagner Group have shaped their policies towards the organization. For example, in 2023 the US Treasury Department designated the Wagner Group as a ‘significant transnational criminal organization’, enabling it to freeze ‘any U.S. assets of Wagner and [prohibit] Americans from providing funds, goods, or services to the group’. Meanwhile, the UK has declared the Wagner Group a terrorist organization, making it illegal for citizens to be its members or support the organization.
So, what’s in a word?
The Wagner Group is just one example of a non-state actor whose name, categorization and, consequently, characterizations, have vexed stakeholders. However, as an actor that continues to commit a range of human rights violations, the Wagner Group is a key case for demonstrating the political implications of the terminology for a spectrum of non-state actors.
Typologies play an important role in building a popular understanding of what roles PMSCs play. While it is not inconceivable that even the clearest of categorizations could be misused or misconstrued, the spectrum offered above in Figure 1 may serve as a helpful model for those interested in categorizing efforts that can contribute to the controlled use of force in achieving state aims.
Dr Whitney Grespin is a Regional Program Lead (AFRICOM) for the Defense Security Cooperation University’s Institute for Security Governance and Visiting Research Fellow at Kings College London, UK.
Dr Caroline Batka is a senior military analyst at Comenius University, Slovakia.
The views expressed in this piece are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the policy or views of the Defense Security Cooperation University, Defense Security Cooperation Agency or US Department of Defense.
